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Discussion of "Opportunities for Assurance Services in the 21st Century:
A Progress Report of the Special Committee on Assurance Services"
Katherine Schipper
University of Chicago
INTRODUCTION
Conventionally, a discussant's task is to comment on a research paper which typically
contains a statement of the research question and its importance, a design for answering that
question, a description of methods used and approaches taken, and a presentation and interpretation
of results. The progress report which I have been asked to discuss does not fit this pattern; instead
of being a research paper, it is a description of an ongoing process or a set of as-yet uncompleted
activities. Therefore, a conventional discussion would not be appropriate, and my discussion will
take the unorthodox approach of commenting on the processes and preliminary recommendations of
the AICPA Special Committee on Assurance Services (the Special Committee) as they are laid out
in Richard Lea's paper.
As I interpret the assignment of the Special Committee, it is to provide answers to two
questions:
(1) What new lines of business should CPA firms enter?
(2) What threats and opportunities are likely to be encountered in doing so?
It is noteworthy that these questions are being addressed at the level of the accounting profession—it
is not easy to imagine similar activities occurring in most industries. Would we, for example, expect
to see the major U.S. airlines or the major U.S. auto manufacturers jointly sponsoring research into
how they could extend their current lines of business? Attempting to carry out this inquiry at the
level of the profession (as opposed to the level of the individual firm) clearly has advantages and
disadvantages, which are commented on in Professor Lea's report and which I will address in
section 3 of this discussion. Sections 1 and 2 contain my comments on the Special Committee's
proposals for answering the two questions posed in this paragraph as those proposals are reported in
Professor Lea's paper.
WHAT NEW LINES OF BUSINESS SHOULD CPA'S ENTER?
What is the appropriate definition of "assurance services"?
In answer to the first question—what new lines of business should CPA firms enter—it would
appear that the Special Committee will recommend that CPA firms become providers of "assurance
services." Under the proposed definition provided by Professor Lea in section I of his report,
"Assurance services are independent professional services that improve the quality of information or
its context for decision-makers." In the text discussion accompanying table 1 in his report,
however, Professor Lea broadens this definition to include "any services that assist information
users in improving the quality of their decision-making information, including their decision
model." Relative to the first definition, the second drops the notion of
professionalism/independence and adds the idea of improving users' decision models.
Both definitions of assurance services provided in Professor Lea's report are expansive
relative to that provided by a group whose 1993 conference was the impetus for the formation of the
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Special Committee;1 the definition provided by the conference participants is: "An assurance service
involves the expression of a written or oral conclusion on the reliability and/or relevance of
information and/or information systems" (The CPA Journal (1996)). Relative to the definitions in
Professor Lea's report, this definition is restrictive in that it confines assurance to opining on
information (or an information system), without taking actions to alter either one.
While in all cases the purpose of the definition is to guide CPAs in expanding their
professional services beyond the provision of traditional audits, the form of the guidance and the
kinds of activities implied differs considerably across the three definitions. The two definitions in
Professor Lea's report focus on quality of information; the 1993 conference definition focuses on
relevance and reliability of information. Do these have the same implications for the expansion of
CPA firms' lines of business?
Professor Lea's report gives relevance and reliability as the two primary characteristics that
make information useful for decision making, so it would appear that quality is measured by some
combination of these two characteristics. This does not mean, however, that all would agree that
these two characteristics exhaustively measure the quality of information, given the implications of
other portions of Professor Lea's report. That is, if the assurance services which CPA firms might
offer would focus on a variety of financial and nonfinancial information (and it appears from the
report that they would), it is by no means clear that quality would be appropriately measured by just
these two attributes.
Other quality measures that in my view are implied by Professor Lea's discussion of specific
forms assurance services might assume include conformity to rules and procedures; if it is assumed
that a system is set up to maximize some objective (which might but need not involve a combination
of relevance and reliability) then quality might increase with the degree of conformity to the
specifications of that system (for example, IS09000 guidelines). A second example is fineness; if
aggregation destroys information, then quality might be increasing the fineness of the information
(as is alleged, for example, in the case of activity-based-costing systems). A third example is
timeliness; some of those who believe that accounting information is losing market share in the
competition for investors' attention would focus on timeliness--perhaps even if it meant some
sacrifice in reliability—as a quality attribute.
The point of these examples is that if CPA firms are to offer assurance services which
improve on the quality of financial and nonfinancial information it may be necessary to take an
expansive (relative to the conventional accounting view which measures quality in terms of
relevance and reliability) view of the attributes which measure quality.2 Defining quality metrics
has implications for choosing which types of assurance services activities would be likely to
improve quality. Since it is these activities which will define the new lines of business for CPA
firms, the choice of measures of quality will have an important influence on this definition.
Is there any internal inconsistency about which lines of business are appropriate?
This is another way of asking: Can a person who improves information quality also attest to
the resulting quality? This question arises because the 1993 conference definition implies the
expression of an opinion about information quality while the two definitions in Professor Lea's
1. In May of 1993 the AICPA sponsored a conference whose participants included representatives of the
practicing profession (including small and medium-sized CPA firms), regulators and academic accountants.
The purpose of the conference was to consider the future of the attest function. Among other things, the
conference participants proposed that the phrase "assurance" be used to describe the collection of activities
envisaged for CPA firms in the future.
2. A more expansive attribute list of high quality information is found in Elliott (1994), who lists reliability,
relevance, credibility and timeliness. This list is of interest because Robert Elliott is the chairman of the
Special Committee.
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report imply taking actions which are intended to alter (improve) information quality. (The question
can also be viewed as raising the issue of auditor independence, a matter which is not the subject of
this discussion.3)
My objective in raising this question is to comment on the distinction between consulting
(which might very often involve the improvement of information quality) and assurance. In making
these comments, I am focusing primarily on the first of three distinctions between consulting and
assurance drawn by Professor Lea in the Appendix ("Assurance vs. Consulting Services") to his
report. In a consulting arrangement, there is a consultant and a recipient of his report (the client-no other party is involved and there is no assumption of a conflict of interest. In contrast, assurance
services are intended to solve or at least mitigate an agency problem-three parties are involved
(preparer, user and attestor); because the user perceives that his interests and those of the preparer
are not congruent he is concerned about the information provided by the preparer; the attestor
reduces this conflict by providing assurances about the information developed by the preparer. If
the attestor gathers the information or is substantially involved in improving its quality, then the
agency relationship no longer involves three distinct parties; partially or wholly merging the attestor
role with the preparer role undermines the ability of the attestation function to solve the agency
problem. It appears to me that such a merger is contemplated by the Special Committee; in the text
discussion accompanying table 1 of his report, Professor Lea emphasizes that many of the assurance
services considered by the Special Committee "would involve adding an assurance component to
present consulting services."
The potential for confusion of roles is visible in the presentation of a "first cut" business
plan for nonfinancial performance measures in the health care industry; the plan appears in section
IV of Professor Lea's report. The definition of assurance services for this business plan notes that
the health care provider might accumulate and present the data and the CPA might report on the
data or the CPA might perform both tasks. This definition does not sharply distinguish the preparer
from the attestor role as (I argue) is required to distinguish attestation from consulting—how then
can sharp distinctions be expected in practice?
While some may argue that sharp distinctions between preparation (involvement in
developing the information) and attestation (opining on some attributes of the information) are
unnecessary as a practical matter, I believe those arguments have to rest on a view of the attestation
function which differs in fundamental ways from the traditional view, in which attestation exists to
solve an agency problem. Absent a full exploration of that alternative view and its implications for
the accounting profession, I think it would be premature to dismiss the practical implications of
mixing the preparer role with the attestation role.
Are some assurance service lines of business less attractive or less suitable for CPA firms than
others?
There are numerous forms of assurance services and the definitions provided in Professor
Lea's report do not provide guidance as to which are most suitable for CPA firms. I believe there is
some possibility that the Special Committee has not in fact been able to distinguish assurance
services where CPAs have a comparative advantage from certain other types of assurance services.
Specifically, table 4 of Professor Lea's report lists "Promising Consumer Needs" for assurance
services which include better information about business risk, information about product quality,
and information about quality of processes and controls (among other things). To provide some
idea of how existing service providers—who are usually not CPAs— meet these customer needs, in a
way that fits the expanded definition of assurance services given in Professor Lea's report, I will
provide four examples.
3. For two quite different perspectives on auditor independence,seeSutton (forthcoming) and Wallman

(1996).
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Example 1 is bond rating agencies, whose objective is to provide independent judgments
about one component of bond valuation models, namely, default risk. Example 2 is sell-side equity
analysts, whose objectives include (among other things) providing information about the business
risk of public companies. Example 3 is accreditation services (e.g., the AACSB) whose objectives
include attesting to the extent to which accredited institutions meet specific benchmarks which are
intended to capture product quality. Example 4 is consumer rating agencies which provide direct
assessments of product quality (e.g., Consumers Union, Bests Insurance Ratings). In all these
cases, external parties take actions to improve the quality of information on which resource
allocation decisions are based; thus, they are providing assurance services.
The point of these examples is not to argue whether CPAs should or should not offer certain
types of assurance services. The point is to note that since there are already providers of some
assurance-like services, it is essential to consider very carefully what are the opportunities in a given
line of business, what is the comparative advantage of the CPA relative to other service providers in
this line of business, and what are the threats to entry (of which existing service providers is just one
example).
WHAT THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES ARE CPA'S LIKELY TO FACE?
In a 1994 article in the Journal of Accountancy, Robert Elliott, the chairman of the Special
Committee, provided a short sketch of his vision of the future for assurance services. In speaking of
the desirability of extending lines of business, Elliott pointed to the notion that dealing with all
kinds of information is the CPA's natural domain: "CPA's have a natural advantage in helping
business decision makers navigate these seas of data [created by on-line information sources] and
gather what will best support their decision needs" (Elliott (1994), p. 78). The question arises as to
what precisely are the determinants of this natural advantage, relative to existing providers of
services that increase information quality, such as investment bankers and consultants? Absent a
full consideration of just where the CPA's competitive advantage lies, it is not clear that entry into
certain assurance lines of business would be successful.
In my view, the most important advantage of the CPA in extending into assurance services is
not expertise; it is the existence of substantial amounts of "brand capital" associated with the CPA
certification-integrity, objectivity, high professional standards of conduct. I argue that a substantial
portion of this brand capital arises from the existence and enforcement of tight regulations (e.g.,
licensing requirements, CPE requirements, GAAS). Some might argue that a portion of the capital
also arises from a careful demarcation between preparing financial statements and attesting to them,
with CPA brand capital supported by the ability of CPAs to demonstrate the independence of their
attestation activities from preparation; I do not consider this source of brand capital in these
comments, except insofar as independence from preparation is caused by regulation.
The question arises: does it make sense to extend the notion of regulation—which gives rise
to brand capital—to the provision of assurance services that may already exist in some wholly or
largely unregulated form? The answer is not clear. It may be that regulation will only hamper
CPAs in competing with less-regulated providers of assurances (e.g., analysts, investment bankers,
consultants). It may also be that the value of the CPA's brand capital could be damaged by
combining regulated and unregulated assurance activities in the same firm; the severity of whatever
damage could ensue is of course an empirical question.4 The question facing the profession as it
considers expansion into assurance services is whether and how the brand capital developed in large
part from the provision of mandatory audits of financial statements-viewed by some as a lowgrowth, price-sensitive business—can be extended profitably into assurance services without

4. This again raises the notion of auditor independence; operational measures of auditor independence have
been debated for years in the context of CPA firms providing management advisory (consulting) services
separate from their audit services.
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destroying the capital.5
THE AICPA'S ROLE IN DEVELOPING NEW ASSURANCE SERVICES
Professor Lea's report contains a proposal that new product development should occur at the
level of the profession (i.e., it should be undertaken by the AICPA). This proposal raises three
questions. First, will the largest firms (those with the internal capability of generating new
products) participate? Second, given the AICPA's role as a professional association, is it useful and
appropriate to add to this role a set of activities which are in some sense directly in conflict with the
Institute's traditional core activities? In other words, would it be more useful to have the AICPA
develop standards for products developed by individual firms? Third, does the fact that financial
statements are standardized and regulated at the level of the profession imply that product
development should take place at the same level?
In answer to the first question, it is no secret to anyone familiar with the activities of Big 6
accounting firms that they are already extending their lines of business. In some instances, the
activity is described as "re-engineering the audit" or "adding value to the audit"; a common element,
however, is the introduction of activities that are close to if not completely within the scope of the
definition of assurance services provided in Professor Lea's report.6 Given their own within-firm
activities, it then becomes an economic decision within each large CPA firm whether to devote
resources (in the form of financial support, ideas and expertise) to the AICPA's efforts as well.
Clearly, there is an economic incentive for large-firm defections from any profession-wide new
product development process, and it is not clear that the AICPA can develop a practicable
organizational structure for developing new products that would neutralize this incentive.7
The second question concerns the perils and advantages of combining professional
association activities with new product development activities. I believe that table 3 of Professor
Lea's report lays out the conflict clearly. In particular, professional associations with self-regulatory
functions must be characterized by consensus development, open processes, and multiple review
and approval processes if they are to develop effective standards. These three features in particular
are in direct conflict with the desired specifications (also in table 3) of a new product development
process. While Professor Lea's report seems to be quite firm on the suggestion that the AICPA
modify itself as necessary to accommodate the new product development process, the report does
not seem to me to make a compelling case that the accounting profession as a whole is sure to be
better off in the long run if some aspects of the self-regulatory function were sacrificed to put a new
product development process in place. In the discussion of this issue in Professor Lea's report, I
found insufficient weight placed on the role of the self-regulatory function in developing CPA
brand capital and relatively too much weight placed on the value of having new product
development occur within a professional association; others might have different views, but the
point is that making this choice will have profound effects on the future of the profession.

5. The point that providing mandatory audits is a low-growth, price-sensitive line of business has been made
in many places; for one such example, see Elliott (1995).
6. For a summary of selected activities among Big 6 firms, seeEmerson's Professional Services Review
(May-June, 1996), "Coopers &Lybrand: Creating a "Whole New Ball Game" for Business Assurance
Services." While the focus of the article is on Coopers &Lybrand, certain activities of Arthur Andersen,
Price Waterhouse, Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG Peat Marwick are also touched upon.
7. Section III of Professor Lea's report ("Overview of a 'New Lines' Development Process") lays out the basis
for the committee's recommendation that the AICPA undertake new product development for the profession,
discusses certain strengths and weaknesses of the AICPA in this role, and notes that the AICPA must change
some of its approaches and structures if the development efforts are to succeed.
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The third question draws an analogy between financial statements (an "industry-level"
product) and new assurance services—if the former is regulated at the industry level then new
product developments should occur there too. This analogy appears in Robert Elliott's comments at
The CPA Journal Symposium on the Future of Assurance Services (The CPA Journal (1996)):
The accounting profession and typical market-driven business activity are different. Our
product design takes place at the industry level. For example, my firm cannot design its own
financial statement presentation using its own GAAP....We have a standardized product...and
our research and development takes place at the industry level, not the company one.
In my view, this analogy depends on the assumption that whatever new assurance services are
provided by CPA firms will be regulated and standardized along the same lines as financial reports.
It is not clear to me, given the diverse ways that Big 6 firms have begun to extend into business
assurances, whether such standardization and regulation are currently in place. However, the
extensions so far have been relatively modest compared to those apparently envisaged by the
Special Committee and the possibility remains that the most appropriate approach might be to fold
assurance services into the same type of regulatory framework that is currently provided by GAAS.
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